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Student Comments
Colorado v. Bertine: An Expansion of the
Inventory Doctrine as Applied to Vehicles
and its Impact on Illinois Law
I. INTRODUCTION
When a police officer lawfully impounds a vehicle,' that officer
may conduct an inventory search to secure the contents of the ve-
hicle, and may seize any contraband or evidence of a crime found
during the search.2 Inventory searches are reasonable under the
fourth amendment 3 if made pursuant to standardized police regu-
1. The United States Supreme Court has stated that vehicles may be impounded
when they interrupt traffic and when they violate parking ordinances. South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976). See infra note 14 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing when the need to impound arises). For a discussion of when the police may
impound a vehicle, and a criticism of the Supreme Court's failure to fully address that
issue, see Reamey, Reevaluating the Vehicle Inventory, 19 Crim. L. Bull. 325 (1983). See
also 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZuRE 7.3(c)-(e), at 85-95 (1978) [hereinafter
LAFAVE] (discussing the impoundment of vehicles for safekeeping, illegal parking, and
unsafe condition).
The Illinois courts have followed Opperman by holding that vehicles can be impounded
when they impede traffic or threaten public safety and convenience. People v. Schultz, 93
Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1075-76, 418 N.E.2d 6, 9 (1st Dist. 1981). A vehicle cannot be im-
pounded, however, simply because it will be left unattended by the arrestee. Id. at 1076,
418 NE.2d at 9. Additionally, a police regulation authorizing the impounding of a vehi-
cle does not determine the lawfulness of the impounding under the fourth amendment.
Id. See also People v. Brown, 100 Ill. App. 3d 57, 426 N.E.2d 575 (2d Dist. 1981) (police
could not impound a lawfully parked automobile); People v. Valdez, 81111. App. 3d 25,
400 N.E.2d 1096 (2d Dist. 1980) (police had no authority to take vehicle from private
parking lot); People v. Von Hatten, 52 Ill. App. 3d 338, 367 N.E.2d 556 (4th Dist. 1977)
(automobile owner has right to maintain his vehicle where it was legally parked).
2. See Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976). See also 3 LAFAVE, supra note, 1 at 7.4(a), at 98-116. For a discussion
of inventory searches of automobiles before Opperman, see Miles & Wefing, The Automo-
bile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SETON HALL 105,
108, 133-44 (1972); Stroud, The Inventory Search and the Fourth Amendment, IND. LEG.
FORUM 471 (1971); Note, The Inventory Search of an Impounded Vehicle, 48 CHI. KENT
L. REv. 48 (1971); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures ofAutomobiles, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 835, 845-53 (1974); Comment, Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehicles and the
Exclusionary Rule, 29 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 197 (1972). For a discussion of inventory
searches after Opperman, see Reamey, supra note 1, at 325; Ruebner, Automobile Stops
and Searches, 19 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045 (1988); Comment, Automobile Inventories and
the Fourth Amendment: South Dakota v. Opperman, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (1977).
3. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
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lations.4 The fourth amendment requirements of a warrant, prob-
able cause, or articulable suspicion are inapplicable to the
inventory search.'
In Colorado v. Bertine,6 the United States Supreme Court ex-
tended inventory searches to containers found in an impounded
vehicle. This decision rejects the approach taken by the Illinois
Supreme Court in People v. Bayles,7 which held that an inventory
search could not extend to closed containers in a vehicle. The
Bayles court followed the reasoning and language of South Dakota
v. Opperman,s which upheld an inventory search of an impounded
vehicle.
This Comment will trace the development of the vehicle inven-
tory search doctrine. First, the Opperman opinion will be dis-
cussed. The Comment will then discuss the application of
Opperman by the Illinois Supreme Court to Bayles. Finally, this
Comment will consider the ramifications of the Bertine opinion on
Illinois law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Opperman v. South Dakota
In Opperman v. South Dakota, the defendant's car was cited
twice for illegal parking.9 Pursuant to standard procedures, police
officers impounded the car and conducted an inventory of its con-
tents. During the search, a police officer found a container of mari-
juana in the glove compartment.10 The South Dakota Supreme
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. The plurality in Opperman stated that "[t]he decisions of this Court point unmis-
takably to the conclusion reached by both federal and state courts that inventories pursu-
ant to standard police procedures are reasonable." Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372. The
Opperman Court gave no clear indication of what constituted "standard procedures."
The concurring opinion, however, stressed that the police officer's discretion had to be
limited because if the police make a nondiscretionary determination to search, there are
no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. Id. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring).
But see Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 744-46.
5. See Reamey, supra note 1, at 325; Ruebner, supra note 2, at 1046.
6. 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
7. 82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 923 (1981).
8. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
9. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 365-66.
10. Id. at 366.
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Court held that the search was unreasonable under the fourth
amendment because it involved a substantial invasion of privacy. "
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the in-
ventory did not violate the fourth amendment. 12 The Court first
noted that automobiles frequently are searched without a warrant
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.13 The
Court explained that the police have greater freedom when dealing
with automobiles because they are frequently in contact with
automobiles when performing regulatory and safety functions. 14
The Court refused to rely on a probable cause analysis when
determining the validity of the inventory search because the prob-
able cause standard relates to criminal investigations and an inven-
tory search is not conducted for an investigatory purpose. 5
Rather, after the vehicle is impounded, the analysis focuses on
whether the inventory search was reasonable under the fourth
amendment. 16  Enunciating a standard of reasonableness, the
11. State v. Opperman, 89 S.D. 25, 228 N.W.2d 152 (1975). The court first con-
cluded that the inventory was a search under the fourth amendment because it was a
substantial invasion of privacy. Id. at 29, 31, 228 N.W. 2d at 154-55. The court then
held the search unreasonable, distinguishing the three cases subsequently relied upon by
the United States Supreme Court to uphold the search. Id. at 33-36, 228 N.W.2d at 156-
58. See infra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the South Dakota
Supreme Court's reasoning.
12. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376.
13. The automobile exception is justified because cars are mobile and there is a lesser
expectation of privacy in an automobile than in a home or office. Id. at 367. The
Supreme Court stated: "The expectation of privacy is further diminished by the obviously
public nature of automobile travel." Id. at 368. See Cradwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583,
589-90 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458-64 (1971); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 46-52 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
14. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368. One such function is the impounding of vehicles that
are interrupting traffic. Id. Vehicles can also be impounded for violations of parking
ordinances. Id. at 369. The Oppennan Court stated that automobiles violating parking
ordinances "jeopardized both the public and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic."
Id. The Court added that "[the authority of police to seize and remove from the streets
vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond chal-
lenge." Id.
15. Id. at 370, n.5. The Court stated: "The standard of probable cause is peculiarly
related to criminal investigations, not routine, non-criminal procedures." Id. The Court
nonetheless looked to the expectation of privacy to determine the reasonableness of the
intrusion. See supra notes 13-14 (where the court looked to the expectation of privacy in
an automobile).
16. Id. at 370-73. The Court noted that state courts had concluded that even if an
inventory is a search governed by the fourth amendment, it is a constitutionally permissi-
ble intrusion. In the present case, South Dakota conceded that the inventory was a
search under the fourth amendment. Id. at 370 n.6. Justice Powell stated that "despite
their benign purpose, when conducted by government officials [inventory searches] con-
stitute 'searches' for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 377 n.1. The lead-
ing case before Opperman, Mozetti v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 4 Cal. 3d
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Court relied on three cases which concluded that inventory
searches were reasonable. In Cooper v. California,17 the Court al-
lowed an inventory of a car that the police held for forfeiture pro-
ceedings."8 The Cooper Court noted that because the car was in
police possession for a considerable time, the police had reason to
search it for their own protection.' 9 In Harris v. United States,20
the Court held a search reasonable because evidence was found in
plain view while the police performed the narrow function of lock-
ing a vehicle.2' Lastly, the Opperman Court cited Cady v. Dom-
browski,22 which upheld an inventory search because the police
suspected that the vehicle contained a weapon.23
Although Opperman differed factually24 from Cooper, Harris,
and Cady, the United States Supreme Court held that the cited
cases were controlling. The Court reasoned that the inventory
search in Opperman was prompted by the "needs" that the prior-
cases recognized: the protection of the owner's property; the pro-
tection of the police from claims of lost or stolen property; and the
protection of the police against potential dangers.25
Although the only interest that the state had in inventorying the
contents of Opperman's car was to protect his property,26 the
699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1971), held that inventory searches of vehicles were
searches under the fourth amendment. See LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 96 (the better view
is that inventories are searches for the purposes of the fourth amendment).
17. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
18. Id. at 61. The Opperman Court noted that in Cooper no warrant was issued for
the search, nor was there probable cause to search for contraband. Opperman, 428 U.S. at
373. Furthermore, the search was not limited to a forfeiture proceeding because there
"was no reason for the police to assume automatically that the automobile would eventu-
ally be forfeited to the state." Id. at 373, n.8.
19. Cooper, 386 U.S. at 61-62.
20. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
21. Id. The Court noted that in Harris, a warrant was unnecessary because the intru-
sion was justiable to protect the car while in police custody. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374.
22. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
23. Id. at 436-37, 447. The warrantless intrusion was justifiable in Cady because it
"was incident to the caretaking function of the local police to protect the community's
safety." Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374.
24. The South Dakota Supreme Court had found that Cooper, Harris, and Cady were
not on point. The court found Cooper inapposite because forfeiture proceedings had not
commenced. Opperman, 89 S.D. at 33, 228 N.W.2d at 157. Cady was distinguished
because the vehicle was not a public nuisance, nor were there exigent circumstances like a
hidden gun as in Cady. Id. at 33-34, 228 N.W.2d at 157. Finally, Harris was limited to
items found in plain view. Id. at 34-35, 228 N.W.2d at 157-58. None of those situations
were present in Opperman. Justice Powell also noted that the cases used by the Court
"each relied in part on significant factors not found [in Opperman]." Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 377 n.2. (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369.
26. Id. at 377-79, nn. 2-3 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Court held the search reasonable.17 The Court stated that the po-
lice searched the car because valuable items were in plain view.2
Moreover, the police conducted the search pusuant to standard
procedures. 29  Finally, the Court noted that the search was not a
pretext for an investigatory search.30
Although the plurality did not define the scope of a permissible
inventory search, restrictive language in Opperman indicates that
the search should be limited to areas of the vehicle in which valu-
ables may be stored. 31  Further, the plurality seemed to adopt a
less intrusive means32 approach when determining whether the po-
lice could impound the vehicle if the owner was unable to make
other arrangements for its care. 33 Justice Powell's concurrence in-
dicated that, although the state may have an interest in conducting
inventories, this interest was not a "general license" to search.34
B. People v. Bayles
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Bayles relied on the re-
strictive language in Opperman to invalidate an inventory search of
27. Id. at 376.
28. Id. at 375-76. This justification has been criticized since the South Dakota
Supreme Court interpreted its state law as limiting police liability to items in plain view.
Id. at 391. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Therefore, although the extensive search is
"prompted" by those items, the need to protect the pol'ce from liability is not present
beyond items in plain view. Id. at 378 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 365-66.
30. Id. at 376.
31. The plurality stated that "standard inventories often include an examination of
the glove compartment, since it is a customary place for documents of ownership and
registration ... as well as a place for the temporary storage of valuables." Id. at 372.
This language implies that areas of the vehicle in which valuables are not stored cannot
be searched. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at I11.
32. "Less intrusive means" is an approach that seeks to achieve desired goals with
minimal intrusion into the expectations of privacy. For example, in the inventory search
context, a less intrusive means than an inventory search to protect an arrestee's property
would be to allow the arrestee to make arrangements for its care. Id. at 375. In Opper-
man, Justice Marshall would require the police to exhaust "reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to identify and reach the owner of the property in order to facilitate alter-
nate means of securing" the owners consent to the search. Id. at 394 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Obtaining consent would be less intrusive than an inventory search. Id. In
People v. Hamilton, 74 I1. 2d 457, 386 N.E.2d 53 (1979), the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted a less intrusive means approach by holding that the objectives of protecting the
arrestee's property and protecting the police from danger could be fulfilled by sealing the
container with tape and placing it in a locker or storage room. Id. at 469-70, 386 N.E.2d
at 59.
33. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375. See LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 89-90 (there is a grow-
ing body of law that arrestee must be allowed to make alternate arrangements).
34. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell added that
the police officer has no discretion as to the scope or the subject of the search. Id. at 384.
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a closed container.3" The Bayles court determined that, although
the Opperman Court allowed the police to inventory the contents
of the vehicle, it "did not involve the opening of closed containers
transported in the vehicle."'3 6  The Bayles court concluded that
Opperman did not authorize the search of closed containers. Fur-
ther, the court ruled that a search is not necessarily reasonable
merely because it is conducted according to established police
procedure."
The Bayles court considered the expectation of privacy in a
closed container to determine the reasonableness of the inventory
search.3" This analysis mirrors the Opperman Court's focus on the
expectation of privacy in a vehicle when determining the reasona-
bleness of the inventory.39 The Bayles court noted that United
States v. Chadwick 40 recognized a greater expectation of privacy in
luggage because it is a "repository of personal effects."'41 Further-
more, under Arkansas v. Sanders,2 if personal luggage is searched
35. People v. Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
923 (1981). In Bayles, the defendant was involved in a one car accident in which a suit-
case and string sack were thrown out of the car. The police, pursuant to established
procedures, opened the containers and inventoried the contents, finding marijuana and
methaulone. Id. at 131-34, 411 N.E.2d at 1347-48. See People v. Salter, 91 111. App. 3d
831, 414 N.E.2d 1252 (1980) (following Bayles, holding that an inventory search of a
closed container found in an impounded vehicle is unconstitutional under the fourth
amendment). See Ruebner, supra note 2, at 1056.
36. Bayles, 82 Il. 2d at 136, 411 N.E.2d at 1350. The court quoted Justice Powell's
..general license" statement, as well as Justice Marshall's statement interpreting the plu-
rality opinion as not authorizing the search of closed containers. Id. Justice Marshall
stated that "the Court's opinion does not authorize the inspection of suitcases, boxes, or
other containers which might themselves be sealed, removed, and searched without fur-
ther intrusion." Opperman, 428 U.S. at 388 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d at 142, 411 N.E.2d at 1353.
38. Id. at 135-41, 411 N.E.2d at 1349-52.
39. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
analysis of expectation of privacy in a vehicle).
40. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, federal agents arrested the defendants at a Bos-
ton train station. The agents searched the defendants' padlocked footlocker about an
hour and a half after the arrest and found marijuana. Id. at 3-5. The Court held that,
although the federal agents had probable cause, the agents still needed a warrant. Id. at
11. The Court refused to extend the automobile search exception to closed containers
because the factors that diminished the privacy interest in an automobile (registration,
licensing, inspection, use as a means of transportation) were inapplicable to closed con-
tainers. Id. at 13.
41. Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d at 138, 411 N.E.2d at 1350 (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13).
42. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). In Sanders, the police, acting on an informant's tip, arrested
the defendant shortly after his arrival by plane in Little Rock, Arkansas. The police
retrieved a suitcase from the taxi in which the defendant was to leave the airport. The
officers searched the suitcase without a warrant or the defendant's consent. Id. at 755-56.
The Court refused to extend the automobile exception to closed containers in a vehicle.
Id. at 762-65. The Court held that, when "the police without endangering themselves or
Colorado v. Bertine
without a warrant, there must be exigent circumstances present.43
After noting the high privacy interest afforded to closed contain-
ers, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the reasonableness test rec-
ognized in Opperman. The Bayles court held that the police
violated the fourth amendment protection against intrusive inven-
tory searches of closed containers in an impounded vehicle."4 In
considering the intrusiveness of the search, the court determined
that the need to protect the police from danger did not justify the
search because the police failed to demonstrate that the contents of
the container posed a danger.45 The court also concluded that pro-
tection of the owner's property and protection of the police from
claims of lost or stolen property could have been achieved in a less
intrusive manner.46
risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have detained one suspected of criminal activity and
secured his suitcase, they should delay the search thereof until after judicial approval has
been obtained." Id. at 766.
43. Bayles, 82 I11. 2d at 139, 411 N.E.2d at 1351-52. The court noted that exigent
circumstances such as "danger to the officers or the destruction or mobility of the evi-
dence" may justify opening a closed container. Id. at 143, 411 N.E.2d at 1353.
44. Id. at 144, 411 N.E.2d at 1353.
45. Id. at 143, 411 N.E.2d at 1353.
46. Id. The court stated: "These two objectives could have been fulfilled by sealing
the suitcase with tape and placing it in a locked locker or a storage room." Id. (citing
People v. Hamilton, 74 Ill. 2d 457, 386 N.E.2d 59 (1979)). In delineating the acceptable
scope of an inventory, the Bayles court held that the vehicle's "integral part[s]" could be
searched, but less intrusive means were required when the police sought to inventory the
closed containers in the car. The Bayles court noted that Opperman involved only an
integral part of the automobile -the glove compartment-and not a container. Accord-
ing to Bayles, therefore, the Opperman holding was limited to that situation. Id. at 136,
411 N.E.2d at 1351-52.
This less intrusive means requirement subsequently has been applied by an Illinois
appellate court in People v. Velleff, 94 Ill. App. 3d 820, 419 N.E.2d 89 (2d Dist. 1981).
The court in Velleff held that the police did not exhaust less intrusive means when they
inventoried the contents of a car that had been legally parked on the street. Id. at 823-24,
419 N.E.2d at 92. In Velleff, police officers stopped the defendant for driving a vehicle
with a cracked windshield and only one license plate. The defendant followed the police
to the station and parked the car on a nearby street. The police brought the car to their
lot and searched it. They found a gun in a plastic bag in the trunk. Id. at 822, 419
N.E.2d at 91. The court held that, because the defendant had a companion who could
have driven the car, the police failed to exhaust less intrusive means to protect his prop-
erty. Id. at 823-24, 419 N.E.2d at 92. The Velleff court also cited Bayles for the proposi-
tion that closed containers in a vehicle could not be searched absent exigent
circumstances. Id. at 824, 419 N.E.2d at 92 (citing Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d at 143, 411 N.E.2d
at 1353).
See also People v. Salter, 91 111. App. 3d 831, 414 N.E.2d 1252 (1st Dist. 1980). In
Salter, police officers stopped the defendant for having a bent license plate. Following
police procedure, the officers inventoried the contents of the vehicle, including a bag in
the car which contained a gun, marijuana, and cocaine. Id. at 832-33, 414 N.E.2d at
1254. The court held that there was no danger to the officer and, further, that the objec-
tives of protecting property and protecting the police against false claims could have been
1988] 1103
1104 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 19
CoLoRADo v. BERTINE
A. The Facts
In Colorado v. Bertine,47 a police officer stopped the defendant
because the officer observed the defendant speeding and making
frequent lane changes. After conducting a field sobriety test, the
officer arrested the defendant for driving under the influence.48
Subsequently, another officer inventoried the contents of the de-
fendant's van, including a zippered backpack located behind the
front seat.49 The backpack contained three coffee cans in which
the officer found cocaine, related paraphernalia, and seven hundred
dollars in cash. 50
The trial court, basing its decision on Illinois v. Lafayette,5" de-
nied the defendant's motion, on fourth amendment grounds, to
suppress the items found in the backpack.52  The court, however,
did grant the motion under article II, section 7 of the Colorado
Constitution.53 In an interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of
achieved in a less intrusive manner. Id. at 834, 414 N.E,2d at 1255. But see People v.
Braasch, 122 I1. App. 3d 747, 461 N.E.2d 651 (2d Dist. 1984). In Braasch, the court
questioned the Bayles holding and the requirement of less intrusive means and upheld an
inventory search of a closed paper bag in the defendant's trunk. Id. at 755-56, 461
N.E.2d at 658. The Braasch court relied on Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983),
which held that inventory searches of closed containers carried by an arrestee at the time
of arrest were reasonable. Id. at 755, 461 N.E.2d at 657-58. Although Braasch expanded
the scope of the search to closed containers in the trunk, the subject of the search was still
restricted by the less intrusive means test. Id. at 752, 461 N.E.2d at 656. The arrestee's
car was impounded because the owner was unable to make other arrangements and leav-
ing it parked on the highway would violate the Illinois Vehicle Code. Id. at 753, 461
N.E.2d at 656. Compare this view with that of the Bertine Court, which seems to indi-
cate the less intrusive means approach does not restrict the subject of the search. See
infra note 64 and accompanying text.
47. 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
48. 706 P.2d 411,412 (Colo. 1985).
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id.
51. 462 U.S. 640 (1983). In Lafayette, the defendant was arrested for disturbing the
peace. Id. at 641, At the station, the police conducted an inventory search of a "purse-
type shoulder bag" the defendant had with him. Id. at 642-43. Ten amphetamine pills
were found inside a cigarette package that the police obtained from the bag. Id. at 642.
The Supreme Court upheld the search, concluding that it was reasonable under the
fourth amendment. Id. at 648. The Court noted that the inventory search was necessary
to protect the police against false claims and that "dangerous instrumentalities--such as
razor blades, bombs, or weapons--can be concealed in innocent-looking articles taken
from the arrestee's possession." Id. at 646. The Court also noted that the inventory
search was a reasonable administrative procedure. Id. For a discussion of Lafayette, see
Note, Illinois v. Lafayette: How the Fourth Amendment Vanished in the Face of Adminis-
trative Expediency, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 218 (1984).
52. People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d at 413.
53. Id. at 414 (citing COL. CONST. art. III, § 7).
Colorado v. Bertine
Colorado affirmed the trial court, but premised its holding on the
fourth amendment.5 4 The court determined that the police had
failed to use less intrusive means to protect the backpack. The
court reasoned that the defendant had a high expectation of pri-
vacy55 in the backpack and the police could have searched it legiti-
mately only if exigent circumstances existed.5 6 Finally, the court
noted that the police had not attempted alternate means for the
care of the vehicle.
B. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Supreme Court of Colorado, 58 holding that the inventory search
did not violate the fourth amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, rejected the state supreme court's argu-
ments and expanded the Lafayette holding to include closed con-
tainers found in an impounded vehicle.59 The Court concluded
that reasonableness was not tested by expectation of privacy, a fac-
tor considered in a probable cause analysis, but rather by whether
the inventory fulfilled the objectives articulated in Opperman. °
The Bertine Court held that the governmental interests identified
in Opperman outweighed the individual's fourth amendment inter-
est.6' Because there was no showing of investigatory motive by the
54. Id. at 419.
55. The court stated that Opperman "established the balancing test weighing the le-
gitimate governmental interests advanced by the search against the invasion of privacy
which the search entailed." 706 P.2d at 414.
56. Id. at 417.
57. Id. at 418.
58. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 743.
59. Id. at 742. The majority held that reliance on Chadwick and Sanders in inventory
search cases is unfounded because those cases dealt with situations involving probable
cause. Id. at 741. Because the police lacked an investigatory motive, the majority rea-
soned that a probable cause analysis was "unhelpful. ' ' Id. For an analysis of Chadwick
and Sanders, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
60. Id. Additionally, there must be "standard criteria." Id. at 743. See infra note 65
and accompanying text. This requirement is to ensure that the inventory is not a pretext
for an investigatory search because the police officer has little discretion when the inven-
tory is conducted pursuant to standard procedures. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 383
(Powell, J., concurring).
61. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 742. Although the Court did not expressly state what the
individual's fourth amendment right entails, the Court implied that the fourth amend-
ment affords protection only from "unreasonable" searches and seizures and not from
intrusive searches. Id. at 743. The Court seemed to indicate that a search is not unrea-
sonable because it is intrusive: rather. the Court appeared to indicate that a search is
ui ccasonahle in the inventory search cuntext if not conducted pursuant to legitimate
care-taking functions. Id.
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police, the search was reasonable.62
The majority rejected arguments that Bertine could be distin-
guished from Lafayette because, in Bertine, there was no danger
that the arrestee could introduce contraband or weapons into the
jail facility. The Court stated that the station house setting was not
crucial to the Lafayette holding because other governmental inter-
ests justified the search.63 Additionally, the Court concluded that
the Lafayette decision did not mandate a less intrusive means ap-
proach. Thus, it was irrelevant that the police could have allowed
Bertine to make other arrangements for the care of his van. 64 Fi-
nally, the Court held that a police officer may use a certain amount
of discretion so long as it is pursuant to "standard criteria" and not
"something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal
activity. 6-
C. The Dissent
Justice Marshall's dissent criticized the Court's application of
Opperman and Lafayette. The dissent noted that the majority
opinion allowed the police officer to exercise discretion in deter-
mining whether to impound.66 According to the dissent, this was
contrary to the requirement in Opperman and Lafayette that the
police follow standardized procedures.67 Justice Marshall also
noted that Justice Powell's concurrence in Opperman stressed that
the police should not have any significant discretion concerning the
subject or scope of the search.68
62. Id. at 742.
63. Id. The other interests were the protection of property and the protection of the
police against false claims. Id.
64. Id. The Court quoted Lafayette: "[t]he real question is not what 'could have been
achieved,' but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps .... The reasonable-
ness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the
existence of alternate 'less intrusive' means." Id. at 742 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. at 647) (emphasis in original). Compare this statement with Justice Burger's view in
Opperman, indicating that alternate arrangements should be made when possible. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 743.
66. Id. at 744-46. Justice Marshall noted that at trial the officer who conducted the
inventory stated that it was "his own individual discretionary decision" to search the
vehicle instead of parking and locking it. Id. at 745. Under department procedures, the
police officer could have either allowed a third person to take custody of the vehicle, or
allowed the driver to park the vehicle if neither the vehicle nor its contents were evidence
of a crime, or impound the vehicle. Id.
67. Id. at 744.
68. Id. See supra note 34. The concurrence in Bertine also indicated that the officer
conducting the inventory should not have discretion. According to the Bertine concur-
rence, the inventory search could be conducted only pursuant to standard police proce-
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The dissent balanced the individual's expectation of privacy
against the governmental interests.69 Justice Marshall concluded
that the interest in protecting police against claims is weak be-
cause, even if the police conduct an inventory, a defendant may
assert that the officer purposely omitted an item.70 Regarding the
interest in protecting the police from danger, the dissent concluded
that the potential danger from an impounded vehicle was so small
that it failed to justify an intrusion .7  The only remaining interest,
the protection of the owner's property, also failed to justify an in-
ventory.72 According to the dissent, the state easily could have
protected the arrestee's property by allowing the arrestee to make
alternate arrangements.73 Moreover, the state's interests were
weaker than in Opperman, and the search into the closed container
was more intrusive than a search of an automobile.
Finally, the dissent focused on the applicability of the Lafayette
dures and could not be for investigatory purposes. The concurrence would allow
inventories of closed containers found in a vehicle only if all impounded vehicles were
similarly inventoried. Id. at 744. The result of the concurrence's approach would be to
eliminate police discretion regarding the scope of the inventory but still allow police dis-
cretion in determining whether to impound.
Responding to the dissent's argument that the procedures allowed police officers too
much discretion to the officers, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the dissent only "se-
lectively" quoted from the police directive. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that discretion
was limited because the police could "not park and lock the vehicle where there [was a]
reasonable risk of damage or vandalism to the vehicle or where the approval of the arres-
tee [could not] be obtained." Id. at 743 n.7.
69. Id. at 746. The governmental interests are the three "needs" articulated in Opper-
man. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 747. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Marshall referred to the Opper-
man concurrence, in which Justice Powell stated that "inventories are [not] a completely
effective means of discouraging false claims, since there remains the possibility of accom-
panying such claims with an assertion that an item was stolen prior to the inventory or
was intentionally omitted from the police records." Id. (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. 378-
79 (Powell, J., concurring)).
71. Id. Justice Marshall noted that this interest failed to receive the support of a
majority of the Court in Opperman as Justice Powell, who cast the deciding vote in
Opperman, stated: "there is little danger associated with impounding unsearched vehi-
cles ...." Id. (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 378 (Powell, J., concurring)).
72. Id. at 748.
73. Id. Justice Marshall noted that the Opperman plurality considered whether the
owner was available to make other arrangements. The Bertine majority rejected this fac-
tor. Id. There was evidence in the record indicating that the defendant in Bertine would
have been willing to park the vehicle on a nearby street and leave it unattended for a
short time. Id. The Bertine Court stated that "while giving Bertine an opportunity to
make alternate arrangements would undoubtedly have been possible," Lafayette does not
require less intrusive means. Id. See supra note 64.
74. Id. Justice Marshall stated that Opperman did not involve a search of closed
containers or other items that "touch upon intimate areas of an individual's personal
affairs." Id. (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 380 n.7).
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decision to Bertine. Because Lafayette dealt with the possibility of
a defendant's bringing contraband or weapons into the station,
there was a "powerful interest" in conducting an inventory
search.7- Accordingly, when the station house concerns are absent,
the search is inappropriate.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. An Expansion of Opperman by the Rejection of Expectation
of Privacy
Opperman contains language limiting both the timing and physi-
cal scope of an inventory search. 76 In addition, the Opperman con-
currence contained restrictive language indicating that closed
containers in impounded vehicles are protected from inventory
searches."
In Bertine, the Supreme Court, by not recognizing a higher ex-
pectation of privacy in closed containers, extensively expanded the
scope of vehicle inventory searches beyond that which was in-
tended in Opperman. Although the Opperman plurality rejected a
probable cause approach when examining the reasonableness of an
inventory search, 8 it looked to the diminished expectation of pri-
vacy as a justification for inventories of impounded automobiles.79
In Bertine, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized the need to consider
expectation of privacy when he stated: "In light of those strong
governmental interests and the diminished expectation of privacy
in an automobile, we upheld the search [in Opperman]."80
In Bertine, the expectation of privacy was much greater than the
governmental interests.8' If the Court had followed Opperman, it
would have accorded more protection to closed containers because
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 31-33. But see Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 741 n.4 ("Opperman did not
address the question whether the scope of an inventory search may extend to closed con-
tainers located in the interior of an impounded vehicle."). See LAFAVE, supra note 1, at
102 ("Although a superficial reading of the plurality opinion in Opperman might prompt
the conclusion that the Court has given the green light to all police vehicle inventory
procedures, this is not the case.").
77. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 13. The Bertine Court also rejected a probable cause approach but
went further by stating that expectation of privacy is part of a probable cause analysis and
is, therefore, irrelevant in determining the reasonableness of an inventory search. Bertine,
107 S. Ct. at 741.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text, discussing the Illinois Supreme
Court's approach and recognition of the high privacy interest in closed containers. See
also notes 70-72 and accompanying text, discussing the weakness of the state's interest.
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of the increased expectation of privacy, just as the Opperman Court
accorded less protection to automobiles because of the diminished
expectation of privacy.8 2 Instead, the Bertine court distinguished
those cases that had afforded protection to closed containers, rea-
soning that those cases set up a standard for probable cause that
was inapplicable to a non-investigatory search. 3 Although those
cases involved criminal investigations, the higher expectation of
privacy recognized in them should also be recognized to an inven-
tory search.8 4 As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, expectation of
privacy was a factor for the Opperman Court.8 5 The Court, there-
fore, has used the diminished expectation of privacy to justify an
inventory, but has refused to recognize a higher expectation to pro-
tect against intrusive inventories.
B. Impact on Illinois Law
Illinois recognizes a higher expectation of privacy in closed con-
tainers found in an impounded vehicle.8 6 The Illinois Supreme
Court's reasoning in Bayles was almost identical to that of the Col-
orado Supreme Court in Bertine, that closed containers found in an
impounded vehicle should be accorded more protection. After the
United States Supreme Court decision in Bertine, rejecting the rea-
soning in Bayles, the higher level of protection previously recog-
nized in Illinois will no longer be available.
Fourth amendment protection also is reduced by the Bertine
Court's rejection of the less intrusive means approach as a factor in
determining the reasonableness of an inventory.87 This rejection
will have a significant impact on Illinois law. Prior to Bertine, the
failure to use less intrusive means was considered by the Illinois
courts as evidence of investigatory motive by the police. 88 With
82. See supra note 13, discussing the Opperman Court's analysis of the diminished
expectation of privacy in a vehicle. The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted Opperman
as "establish[ing] the balancing test weighing the legitimate governmental interests ad-
vanced by the search against the invasion of privacy which the search entailed." People v.
Bertine, 706 P.2d at 414.
83. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 741.
84. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court stated: "It is
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected
by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
Id. at 530.
85. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 741.
86. Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d at 137-41, 411 N.E.2d at 1351-52.
87. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
88. See People v. Velleff, 94 Il. App. 3d 820, 823-24, 419 N.E.2d 89, 92 (2d Dist.
1981) ("failure to exhaust less-intrusive alternative before conducting an inventory search
has been held to indicate an improper investigatory motive resulting in an unreasonable
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this limitation gone, the burden may be on the arrestee to show
that the inventory was merely a pretext for a criminal investiga-
tion. 9 Absent a statement from the officer who conducted the
inventory, an arrestee likely will find it impossible to show that his
car was impounded and an inventory was conducted as part of a
"fishing expedition." 9
C. Standard of Reasonableness in Bertine
Instead of balancing the arrestee's expectation of privacy against
the governmental interests, the balancing test used by Bertine
weighs the governmental interests against the arrestee's fourth
amendment rights. 9' These governmental interests, which were
search and seizure"); People v. Valdez, 81 Ill. App. 3d 25, 28, 400 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (2d
Dist. 1980) (unlawful for police to take custody of lawfully parked car); People v. Fox, 62
Ill. App. 3d 854, 857, 379 N.E.2d 917, 918-19 (1978) (inventory search unreasonable
under fourth amendment when police officers could have let passenger drive arrestee's
vehicle).
89. One of the factors leading the Bertine Court to uphold the inventory was an ab-
sence of an investigatory motive by the police. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 743. Presumably, the
arrestee must show an investigatory purpose, although the opinion is not clear on this
point.
90. State v. Opperman, 89 S.D. at 31, 228 N.W.2d at 152. The South Dakota
Supreme Court was afraid that by not providing full fourth amendment protection inven-
tory searches would become "fishing expeditions" that would "whitt[le] away Fourth
Amendment protection." Id. After the United States Supreme Court overturned its hold-
ing in State v. Opperman, 89 S.D 26, 228 N.W.2d 152 (1975), the South Dakota Supreme
Court subsequently invalidated the search on a matter of state constitutional grounds.
State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1976). Although the language of the South
Dakota Constitution was almost identical to the federal constitution, the South Dakota
Supreme Court stated "that logic and a sound regard for the purposes of protection af-
forded by the [South Dakota Constitution] warrant a higher standard of protection than
the United States Supreme Court found necessary under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
674-75.
The Illinois Constitution states:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
other possessions against unreasonable searches and seizures, invasions of pri-
vacy or interception of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
ILL. CONST. ART. I, § 6. The Illinois Constitution appears to provide more protection
against intrusive searches by government than is provided for in the federal constitution.
The Illinois Constitution specifically articulates a right to be free from unreasonable inva-
sions of privacy. Despite this apparently more protective language, the Illinois Supreme
Court has declined to interpret the Illinois Constitution differently than the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal constitution. See People v. Clark, 65 Ill. 2d 169, 357
N.E.2d 798 (1976) (stating that although the state constitution contains a reference to
"invasion of privacy," it will be construed consistent with the federal constitution).
91. For a more detailed review of the Bertine test, see supra note 60 and accompany-
ing text.
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identified in Opperman, are weak in cases similar to Bertine and
Bayles. The interest in protecting against "dangerous instrumen-
talities" is weaker in a vehicle inventory because the concern of
having a defendant bring dangerous instrumentalities into the sta-
tion house are gone.92 The interest in protecting the police against
false claims is weak in almost all situations because state law can
limit liability. Further, false claims may still be brought regardless
of how extensive an inventory may be. 93 Finally, the interest in
protecting the arrestee's property could be accomplished easily by
allowing the arrestee to make alternate arrangements whenever
possible. If the arrestee is allowed to make such arrangements, he
protects his own property and the police are not burdened with
that responsibility. Furthermore, it relieves the police from liabil-
ity and ensures that dangerous instrumentalities are not brought
into the station.
In Bertine, although governmental interests were weak, the ar-
restee's fourth amendment interest failed to outweigh the govern-
mental interests outlined in Opperman.94 The Court focused on
whether the Opperman objectives were pursued by the police
through "standard procedures" and without an investigatory mo-
tive. The fault with this formulation is that it allows significant
intrusions into expectations of privacy in order to meet minimal
governmental interests.
D. The Ramifications of Bertine
The Court seems to have concluded that all inventory searches
are reasonable if the Opperman objectives are met and if the inven-
tories are pursuant to "standard criteria." Although the Court
stated that the inventory could not be conducted for investigatory
purposes, the nebulous requirement of "standard criteria" 95 allows
the police officer to exercise significant discretion. Consequently,
inventories may be conducted as a pretext for criminal investiga-
tions.96 Furthermore, by testing reasonableness on such a deferen-
92. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Although this interest was
not "critical" to the Lafayette holding, the fact that it is weak should weigh in favor of
the arrestee. The Court summarily dismissed this argument.
93. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
94. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. at 742.
95. Opperman required "standard procedures" that were more precise than in Ber-
tine. Also, Opperman allowed no discretion to the officer making the inventory of an
impounded vehicle. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375. See supra note 34 and accompanying
text (discussing Justice Powell's restriction on the police officer's discretion).
96. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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tial standard,97 the Court essentially is allowing police departments
to determine the scope of fourth amendment protection.
V. CONCLUSION
In Bertine, the Supreme Court took a substantial step in dimin-
ishing fourth amendment protection by expanding the inventory
search doctrine to closed containers in an impounded vehicle.
Consequently, the greater protection that the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized will no longer be available. Unless Bertine is
read very narrowly by the courts there will be a tremendous poten-
tial for abuse.
FRED L. ALVAREZ
97. The Court noted the cases relied on in Opperman (Cooper, Harris, and Cady)
"accorded deference to police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehi-
cles and their contents within police custody." Bertine, 107 U.S. at 741.
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